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ABSTRACT
There is a growing awareness, in the United States and Europe,
that emerging adults – those ages 18–25 – are a developmentally
distinct group worth special treatment at the hands of the justice
system. Four US states have proposed raising the age of their
juvenile courts’ jurisdiction beyond age 18 within the last year,
while four out of five European countries have special laws affect-
ing emerging adults. Three European nations – Croatia, Germany,
and the Netherlands – allow youth over age 18 to be sanctioned
in the same manner as younger youth in the juvenile justice sys-
tem, including the possibility of being housed in juvenile facilities.
In March 2018, the Columbia University Justice Lab sponsored an
educational delegation of 20 elected and appointed officials, legal
system stakeholders, service providers, and advocates to Germany
to learn more about the German approach to emerging adults. In
advance of that delegation, the authors in this article examined
the law and practice regarding court-involved emerging adults in
Croatia, Germany, and the Netherlands to glean potential lessons
for US policy-makers considering a developmentally distinct
approach to emerging adults in their justice systems.
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As many US states begin to propose and even implement justice reforms targeted
specifically at emerging adults1 (ages 18–25), the time is ripe for an examination of
the laws and practices in Europe, where Germany, the Netherlands, and Croatia all
provide interesting models for consideration.
There has been a growing recognition in the United States that the justice system is
failing this age cohort and, in turn, compromising public safety. Nationally, emerging
CONTACT Lael Chester lec2115@columbia.edu
1In the context of European justice systems, this age group (ages 18–25) is most often referred to as “young adults,”
and in the United States, it is also often referred to as “transition-age youth.” The authors have chosen to use the
term “emerging adults” in this paper, a term first coined by American psychologist Jeffrey Arnett in 2000, because it
reflects the fact that this transitory developmental period, between childhood and adulthood, is an ongoing process
rather than a stagnant label.
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JUSTICE EVALUATION JOURNAL
https://doi.org/10.1080/24751979.2018.1478443
adults constitute a disproportionate number of people arrested and incarcerated and
have the highest postprison recidivism rates of any age cohort (Chester & Perker, 2017, p.
2). There is also a growing body of research in neurobiology and psychology indicating
that the cognitive skills and emotional intelligence that mark the transition from child-
hood to adulthood continue to develop at least into a person’s mid-20s (Giedd et al.,
1999, pp. 861–863; Howell et al., 2013). Many of the traits so prominent among adoles-
cents – notably their high susceptibility to peer pressure, marked proneness to risk-taking
and impulsive behavior, and tendency to be overly motivated by reward seeking behav-
ior – are also prevalent among emerging adults (Bryan-Hancock & Casey, 2010; Monahan,
Steinberg, Cauffman, & Mulvey, 2009). Researchers have pointed to these characteristics
in regard to the proclivity of youth to engage in criminal behavior (Monahan, Steinberg,
& Piquero, 2015). In distinguishing between children and adults, the United States
Supreme Court has found these developmental markers to have constitutional signifi-
cance under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections against self-incrimination.2
Sociological research has further contributed to a better understanding of this age
group. The transitional period from child to adult – that is, from an immature and
emotionally, financially and practically dependent person to an independent, mature
individual – has become prolonged, with people reaching such key markers as mar-
riage, educational milestones and meaningful employment, later than in previous gen-
erations. These milestones, in turn, are protective factors that help young people,
particularly young males, mature out of delinquency and into adult roles (Schiraldi,
Western, & Bradner, 2015). All of this research is directly relevant to understanding sys-
tem-involved youth, a significant number of whom manage to age-out out of criminal
behavior by age 25; the age at which crime rates fall precipitously (Loeber, Farrington,
& Petechuk, 2013; Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 2003).
Since the creation of separate state juvenile justice systems over a hundred years
ago, the criminal laws and practices in the United States for emerging adults have
been remarkably consistent in one key respect: On or before the 18th birthday, youths
are automatically prosecuted and sentenced as adults, with very little legal distinction
between them and older, more mature adults.
There are indications that this is now being reconsidered: in 2018, the
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont legislatures have all considered bills
that would raise the age of juvenile jurisdiction for most offenses (except the most
serious) beyond a youth’s 18th birthday. In addition, other traditionally “at-18” laws
have been moving up: all states now set the legal age to purchase alcohol at 21
(Federal Trade Commission, 2013). Within the last few years, states have also started
moving up the age for the purchase of tobacco from 18 to 21. As of 11 January 2018,
five states – California, New Jersey, Oregon, Hawaii, and Maine – have raised the
2The following US Supreme Court decisions all include a discussion of the constitutional significance of youthfulness
and immaturity for youth convicted of crimes that occurred before their 18th birthday: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) and J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). Recently, courts have also been asked to consider whether youthfulness has
constitutional significance in cases in which criminal offenses occurred after the person’s 18th birthday. See e.g.,
People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580 (2015) (holding that that a life without parole sentence applied to a 19-
year-old “violates the proportionate penalty language of the constitution as applied to him”).
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tobacco age to 21, along with hundreds of localities across the country.3 For states
that have legalized recreational marijuana, the minimum age has been set at 21 or
higher (Robinson, 2018). A majority of states now allow state-funded extended foster
care or extended child welfare services beyond age 18, departing from the traditional
practice of ending such care at age 18 (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2017). There is, in short, a growing recognition that decisions and actions undertaken
by 18-year-old high school students or 19- and 20-year-old college-aged students may
be mitigated by their lack of maturity and that sanctioning them like fully mature
adults could have life-long consequences that harm the youth and communities and
impinge upon public safety.
Europe, in contrast, has both a history and widespread practice of providing more
developmentally appropriate responses to emerging adults involved in the justice sys-
tem, with 28 out of 35 European countries having special legal provisions for youth
over age 18 (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, pp. 8–10). In summary, the European approach to
emerging adults includes the following:
 20 out of 35 countries (57%) provide for either the application of educational meas-
ures/rehabilitation provided by juvenile law or special rules concerning specific
sanctions for young adults in the general penal law.
 18 out of 35 countries (51%) provide special rules in the adult criminal law con-
cerning the mitigation of penalties for young adults.
 10 out of 35 countries (29%) provide for the mitigation of sanctions according to
the general criminal law as well as the application of juvenile law sanctions.
Germany, the Netherlands, and Croatia provide three interesting examples of these
options that have gone the furthest in applying juvenile court protections to emerging
adults. Although the laws and practices in these three countries differ, one theme that
arises when comparing and contrasting them with the United States is the age chosen
to help define such critical factors as criminal responsibility, youth court jurisdiction,
youth correctional jurisdiction, type and length of sentences, and public access to
criminal records. The United States prosecutes younger youths, provides more oppor-
tunities for trying and sentencing youths as adults, incarcerates youths for longer peri-
ods of time and in adult facilities, provides public access to the criminal records of
youths, and often disregards the distinct developmental stage of youths transitioning
from childhood to adulthood (see Monahan et al., 2015). In Germany, the Netherlands,
and Croatia, each country’s justice system has taken a much different approach, carv-
ing out special provisions for individuals up to their 21st (or, in the case of the
Netherlands, 23rd) birthday, recognizing their ongoing maturation and development
3For a list of the ages set by states and other jurisdictions for the purchase of tobacco and tobacco products, see
https://tobacco21.org and https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/sales_21/
states_localities_MLSA_21.pdf. In just the first two months of 2018, two other states have gotten decidedly closer to
raising the age to 21: Indiana’s House Public Policy Committee voted unanimously to increase the cigarette
purchasing age from 18 to 21 years old (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/indiana/ct-
indiana-smoking-age-20180129-story.html), and Illinois’ Senate Public Health Committee voted 6-2 to prohibit the
sale of tobacco or related products to anyone under 21 (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-
illinois-senate-21-tobacco-20180206-story.html).
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and applying factors that they believe will contribute to better outcomes and
increased public safety.
Youth justice in the United States
Since the creation of the first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, the
United States has developed two separate systems to prosecute people accused of
committing crime: a juvenile system for children and adolescents and an adult criminal
justice system for all older ages. The age range for the separate juvenile system has
never been firmly established. The majority of states do not specify in their laws any
lower age limit for criminal responsibility while others set the age as low as 6. Until
Massachusetts passed a new law in April 2018, designating the 12th birthday as the
lowest age of criminal responsibility, age 10 had been the highest minimum age set
in the country (2 years below the international standard of age 12).4 The upper-age
range has also not been firmly established, and there have even been different ages
set for the different genders (Campaign for Youth Justice, 2016). Although there is a
growing national consensus for the juvenile system to extend to youth up to their
18th birthday, laws vary across the United States. Two consistent factors have been (1)
that every state tries and/or sentences some children under age 18 as adults in the
adult criminal justice system (often depending on the offense alleged) and (2) that on
their 18th birthday (at latest), every state automatically prosecutes and sentences
youths as adults.
Although rarely publicized or researched, some states also have laws, usually called
“youthful offender” provisions, that in essence constitute a hybrid of the juvenile and
adult justice systems that is applied to youth usually before their 18th birthday but
also sometimes after their 18th birthday. Massachusetts’ youthful offender provision is
an example of such a hybrid system used for some youths alleged to have committed
crimes between their 14th and 18th birthdays. If the charges fall within the provision
of the statute,5 a Massachusetts’ prosecutor has the discretion to seek an indictment
by a grand jury and prosecute the youth as a “youthful offender.” The hybrid nature
of these proceedings means that there is a juvenile judge that presides over the case
in juvenile court, but, unlike other juvenile proceedings, these proceedings are open
to the public like adult criminal court. The youth can be “adjudicated” – a term used
in juvenile court – and sentenced in the juvenile correctional system to age 21, the
adult correctional system for much greater periods of time, or both (given an adult
sentence suspended on and after a juvenile sentence).
Other states provide a similar hybrid model for youth past their 18th birthday,
including Vermont, which recently expanded its youthful offender law to apply to
4The National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) provides a graphic documenting the minimum age (or lack of limits)
of juvenile jurisdiction in various states: http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries. For a description of a time in
the history of juvenile court jurisdiction in Illinois when different ages of jurisdiction were chosen for the different
genders, see Willrich (2003, p. 209).
5M.G.L. chapter 119, § 52 defines “youthful offender.” For a detailed summary of the law and legal process, see
Holly Smith and Wendy Wolf, Overview of the Law: Youthful Offender, Youth Advocacy Division, Committee for Public
Counsel Services, October 2013 at https://www.publiccounsel.net/ya/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2014/08/OVERVIEW-
OF-YOUTHFUL-OFFENDER-LAW.pdf
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youths charged with committing crimes up to their 22nd birthday (State of Vermont,
2016). Although the implications of these youthful offender statutes are different in
the various states that have them, in all cases the youths are more likely to be
afforded some of the protections found in juvenile systems (e.g., confidentiality of the
court proceedings or criminal record) and provided rehabilitative service (e.g., place-
ment in a juvenile facility rather than an adult jail or prison) that they would not have
been provided in the adult criminal justice system.
The recent growth in interest in emerging adult justice, and the desire by policy-
makers and justice practitioners to find more effective ways to address the needs of
emerging adults and to increase public safety, has led a number of jurisdictions in the
United States to consider justice reforms. These efforts tend to fall into the following
categories: (1) expansion of the hybrid, “youthful offender” provisions described above,
(2) specialty courts, (3) special caseloads (e.g., probation), (4) special correctional units
or facilities, (5) expansion of the age range of juvenile jurisdiction, (6) increased oppor-
tunity for sealing or expunging criminal records, and (7) special parole provisions.6
Currently, however, no state has embraced the systemic reform of including emerg-
ing adults in their juvenile justice systems as has been proposed in 2018 in
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Vermont. While culturally distinct from the
United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Croatia provide a potential road map for
those states to consider.
European models of youth justice
Worldwide there is far greater diversity among youth justice systems than adult crimi-
nal justice systems, largely due to the diversity of perspectives on childhood, youth,
and adolescence (Weijers, 2017, p. 63). While laws and policies vary between each
country, European youth justice systems tend to fall into two broad categories.
The first is known as the Flexible Model. The UN Committee on the Convention on
the Rights of the Child holds the opinion that a special juvenile justice system must
be in place for young persons until the age of 18. Despite this, several European coun-
tries have laws or policies allowing for the transfer of juvenile defendants to the adult
criminal justice system known as the flexible model (as seen in Belgium and the
Netherlands). However, in Europe, the transfer of juvenile defendants to the adult sys-
tem is far rarer than in the United States (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 92).
The second is known as the Strict Model. In this type of model, European countries
fix an upper age limit of the youth justice system, and preclude the prosecution of
children and young people under that age limit in the adult system under any circum-
stances (as seen in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland). In most strict
model countries, this implies that the youth justice systems have longer maximum
prison sentences, in comparison with the more moderate juvenile sentences of flexible
model countries. However, in strict model countries, the court trial and execution of
6The National Institute of Justice undertook a research project to compile a list of programs and policies designed
to serve justice-involved young adults across the United States. Although it is now slightly out-of-date, it is the most
comprehensive list currently available: Connie Hayek, Environmental Scan of Developmentally Appropriate Criminal
Justice Responses to Justice-Involved Young Adults. June 2016. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice. NCJ 249902. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249902.pdf
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the sentence remain the responsibility of the youth justice authorities (Rap & Weijers,
2014, pp. 92–93).
The past three decades have seen international human rights standards catalyze
youth justice reforms across Europe, including the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice in 1985 (“The Beijing Rules”), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, and the Council of Europe’s 2003 and
2008 recommendations. These international standards have continued the momentum
toward diversion, minimum intervention, education, restorative justice, and other con-
structive measures, even for youths prosecuted for the most serious criminal offenses.
At the same time, most European countries have experienced a reduction in juvenile
delinquency as well as juvenile imprisonment rates (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 681).
Applying the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system to older system-
involved youth is becoming an established norm for the European context. For exam-
ple, the Council of Europe’s 2003 recommendations included the following rule:
“Reflecting the extended transition to adulthood, it should be possible for young
adults under the age of 21 to be treated in a way comparable to juveniles and to be
subject to the same interventions, when the judge is of the opinion that they are not
as mature and responsible for their actions as full adults” (Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers, 2003, para. 11). In effect, the Council of Europe have agreed
that appropriate responses to the particular developmental needs of emerging adults
can often be found in juvenile justice legislation, particularly in light of the prolonged
phases of education and integration into work and family life for modern young adults
(D€unkel, 2016a, p. 697).
In addition to the prolonged transition to adulthood, recent findings in neuro-
science indicating that maturity and psycho-social abilities are not fully developed
until the third decade of life have also been influential (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 708). For
example, the authors of a Model Law on Juvenile Justice proposed by the United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime in 2013 advised that “States should note that a
majority of European States have extended the applicability rationae personae of their
juvenile justice laws to the age of 21 as neuro-scientific evidence and brain development
studies have indicated that it is difficult to distinguish between the brain of an older child
and that of a young adult” (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2013, p. 57).
While emerging adults represent a significant proportion of criminal convictions
and experience high rates of recidivism, most age out of their criminal offending by
their mid-20s. Given their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, European
legislators are recognizing that effectively addressing the needs of this age group is
central to reducing crime (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2010, p. 2). The early
success of countries like Germany, which extended the juvenile criminal law to emerg-
ing adults up to the age of 21 in 1953 has allowed other European countries to see in
practice that treating young people in a manner that reflects their maturity is equally
valid for juveniles as it is for emerging adults (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 708). Only seven out
of 35 European countries do not have some type of special provisions for prosecuting
and/or sentencing young adults (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, pp. 8–10).
While it has been a long-held common practice in Europe for emerging adults held
in confinement to be able to remain in the juvenile prison system into their early 20s
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(Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 4), recent reforms have also expanded the use of other juve-
nile sanctions for the emerging adult population. For example, laws in Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland,
and Russia allow “educational measures”7 under the juvenile criminal law to apply to
young adults (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 61). The Netherlands’ 2014 reforms allowing
juvenile justice sanctions to be applied to emerging adults up to the age of 23 make
the Dutch system a leader in raising the age. However, the existence of the legal pro-
visions allowing the application of juvenile sanctions to emerging adults does not
guarantee extensive use in practice. While Germany applies juvenile justice sanctions
in cases of system-involved emerging adults by default, the Netherlands (and other
countries such as Croatia, Lithuania, and Slovenia) apply juvenile justice sanctions far
less frequently (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 62).
Germany: Utilizing youth court and youth corrections
Jurisdiction of the youth justice system
Germany’s youth justice system is characterized by the approach of minimum interven-
tion with priority given to diversion, and nonpunitive and rehabilitative responses
(referred in Europe as “educational measures”) (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 682). Germany
applies a strict model, which means juveniles under 18 cannot be prosecuted in the
adult criminal court or receive adult criminal sanctions, even where very serious
offenses take place. The guiding principle of the German juvenile justice system is
Erziehung (education and care), referring to the original right and duty of parents,
which the state partly executes when a juvenile commits an offense.
The enactment of the Youth Courts Law (Jugendgerichtsgesetz) (JGG) in 1923 com-
bined justice and welfare approaches, set the age of criminal responsibility at 14 years,
allowed educational measures instead of punishment (particularly instead of imprison-
ment), and introduced the concept of prosecutorial discretion (D€unkel, 2016b; Rap &
Weijers, 2014, p. 89). Reforms in 1953, 1990, and 2008 further emphasized diversion,
educational and rehabilitative sanctions, and restorative responses to youth offending
(Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 93). The 1953 reforms allowed sanctions under the JGG to
apply to 18-, 19- and 20-year-old young adults in place of the general criminal law
(D€unkel, 2016b). In part, this was in response to the situation of the “fatherless
generation” of young people in Germany post-World War II (Clarke, 2015). The 2008
reform clarified the overall aim of juvenile justice in Germany, that is, to prevent indi-
vidual juveniles and emerging adults from committing further offenses
(D€unkel, 2016b).
7The term “educational measure” is often used to embody the elements listed in Section 10 of the German Youth
Courts Act, to distinguish from formal judicial interventions and incarceration. They can include such rehabilitative
measures to improve youth socialization as community service, social training courses, victim-offender mediation,
and vocational training. See, e.g., http://blog.globalyouthjustice.org/?p¼2694. In this paper, the term “educational
measures” will be replaced with a terms more commonly understood in the United States, such as “rehabilitation”
and “community treatment and services.”
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Emerging adults in the justice system
In Germany, the specialized youth court has jurisdiction over juveniles between 14
and 21 years old. A summary of the jurisdiction of the youth court and adult court is
shown in Table 1. Young adults from 18 up to (but not including) 21 can receive a
sentence according to juvenile law or a (mitigated) sentence according to adult crimi-
nal law (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 126). The procedures in the youth court are the same
for young adults as they are for minors (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 94). Under Section
105, JGG, the judge is required to apply a juvenile sanction to young adults up to age
21 under one of two conditions: if the moral, psychological, and social maturity of the
offender is that of a juvenile, or if the type, circumstances, or motives of the offense were
typical of juvenile misconduct (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2010, p. 3).
The Federal Supreme Court has held that typical juvenile crimes are “spontaneous
acts resulting from the developmental forces of juvenile age,” which has included a
case where a 20-year-old young adult killed his 3-month-old baby due to being
angered by the baby’s crying (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 41). Furthermore, the Federal
Supreme Court has ruled that a young adult has the maturity of a juvenile if his or
her personality is still developing (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2010, p. 3).
The youth courts are therefore tasked with considering the young adult’s maturity,
developmental stage, and circumstances when determining the best avenue of treat-
ment (Ishida, 2015, p. 2).
While there is considerable variation between the states, two-thirds of young adults
were sentenced as juveniles in 2012 across Germany overall compared to only 38% of
young adults sentenced as juveniles in 1964 (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 708; Pruin & D€unkel,
2015, p. 42). Steadily, over the years, the judiciary and prosecutors have gained more
faith in this approach, using the juvenile system more frequently for emerging adults.
Typically, the more serious cases are retained in the juvenile jurisdiction, and minor
offenses that require less justice-system involvement, such as traffic infractions, are
dealt with in the adult system (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2010, p. 3). A
Youth Court Judge in Berlin explained during a recent site visit with the authors that
the German courts generally view it to be a benefit for society as a whole to treat
young people up to age 21 in the youth system; “If there is any doubt, judges tend to
apply juvenile law sanctions” (Schiraldi, 2018c).
More than half of emerging adults charged with offenses such as driving under the
influence or without a license are handled in the adult system due to the presence of
a procedure used to manage high caseloads, which does not exist in juvenile criminal
law (traffic offenders receive a fine by way of a sentencing proposal that is sent
directly from the prosecutor to the judge with no need for a hearing). As shown in
Table 1. Summary of the jurisdiction and sanctions of the Youth
Court and Criminal Court in Germany.
Age at time of crime Adjudicated by Sanctions according to
14–17 Youth Court Juvenile Justice
18–20 Youth Court Juvenile Justice (67%)
Youth Court Adult Criminal Law (33%)
21 and over Criminal Court Adult Criminal Law
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Figure 1, in 2012, over 90% of young adults were sentenced under the juvenile law
for homicide, rape, and other serious bodily injury crimes, reflecting the confidence in
the ability of the juvenile justice system to appropriately handle the most serious
offenses (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, pp. 43–44, 46). The large number of young adults
processed via the JGG is also attributable in part to the very severe (by European
standards) mandatory minimum sentences for serious offenses in the adult criminal
code (such as life imprisonment for an act of murder) (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 94).
Judges in the adult system are bound by a formal sentencing framework and the
gravity of the offense with little room for individualized sentencing (however, judicial
discretion in sentencing is arguably still wider in Germany than in the United States)
(Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 41).
Role of police, prosecutors, and the courts
The youth justice system in Germany involves specialized youth courts, youth prosecu-
tors, and, in major cities, specialized youth police units (D€unkel, 2016b). The special-
ized units, known as “Houses of Youth Justice,” contain police, juvenile prosecutors,
social workers, and, in some cases, mediation services, working together to find quick
solutions and alternatives to detention (D€unkel & Heinz, 2017, p. 311). The police must
refer every offense to the prosecutor who can then decide to take no further action or
dismiss the case when an educational measure is already in place (Rap & Weijers,
2014, p. 117). If the likely sentencing outcome is a non-custodial sanction, the prose-
cutor submits a case file to a Youth Judge at the Local Court, and can ask the judge
Figure 1. Adapted from Ineke Pruin and Frieder D€unkel, “Better in Europe? European Responses to
Young Adult Offending” (Universitat Greifswald: Transition to Adulthood, March 2, 2015).
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to impose a minor sanction as a warning, such as community service up to 40 h, a
fine, or mediation (D€unkel, 2016b; Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 117).
If a youth prison sentence is being considered, the Youth Court of the Local Court
is composed of one professional and two lay judges. For more serious cases, such as
homicide or sexual offenses, the case is heard by the Youth Chamber at the District
Court, composed of three professionals and two lay judges (D€unkel, 2016b). The lay
judges are ‘pedagogically capable’ members of the public (one male and one female)
who have equal voting rights on the guilt of the defendant and the sanction (Rap &
Weijers, 2014, p. 126). The youth has one appeal, either to the District Court for a sec-
ond hearing, or the Higher Regional Court of a Federal State for a review of legal
questions, which is intended to speed up trials and enforce the rehabilitative aim of
juvenile justice (D€unkel, 2016b). The limited avenues of judicial review put juveniles at
a disadvantage compared to the adult system from a legal and human rights perspec-
tive. For example, a court decision cannot be appealed solely on the basis of seeking
a different educational measure or rehabilitative service, which is problematic when
“severe” measures are imposed.
Social workers from the community youth welfare department are required to par-
ticipate in the trial and prepare a social inquiry report to give evidence on the per-
sonal background of the system-involved youth and assist the court in finding an
appropriate sanction (D€unkel, 2016b). In reality, this does not occur in less serious
cases due to welfare departments being overburdened (D€unkel, 2016b). In the case of
young adults, social workers provide the youth court with recommendations concern-
ing the application of adult or juvenile criminal law (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 133).
Diversion, confinement, and other penalties
Youth court sanctions are seen as a last resort, with priority given to diversion, fol-
lowed by educational, rehabilitative or disciplinary measures ordered by the youth
courts instead of imprisonment (D€unkel, 2016b). Approximately 70% of the juvenile and
system-involved youth adults are diverted, with youth imprisonment used only rarely (2%
of all cases involving juveniles and young adults) (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 702, 2016b).
Because of the historical abuse of police power under the Nazi regime, diversion
can only be exercised by the prosecutor or the Youth Court Judge with no restriction
on the types/nature of the offenses that are eligible for diversion (D€unkel, 2016b).
Even felony offenses can be diverted under certain circumstances, such as where the
youth has made an apology or repaired the damage caused. Reforms in 1990
expanded the catalogue of youth sanctions to include mediation, community service,
and social training courses among others (D€unkel, 2016b). Victim-offender-reconcilia-
tion has become a significant sanctioning practice in the German youth courts. More
than one-third of all juvenile and young adults’ cases are disposed of through a restor-
ative sanction such as victim-offender-reconciliation or community service (D€unkel,
2016a, p. 703). This includes repaying victims through labor or even direct compensa-
tion, in which the young person’s income is taken into account.
According to the JGG, when a young person is confined, it should “arouse the
youth’s sense of self respect,” “be structured in an educational manner,” and “help the
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youth to overcome those difficulties which contributed to his commission of the crimi-
nal offense” (Youth Courts Law (Jugendgerichtsgesetz), 2008). As shown in Table 2,
the minimum and maximum length of imprisonment that the youth court can order
varies between 14- to 17-year-olds and 18- to 20-year-olds, and also between regular
offenses and very serious offenses (the latter being those for which the adult criminal
sentence is over 10 years imprisonment) (D€unkel, 2016b; Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 93).
Fewer than 1% of young people receive sentences of 5–10 years, and fewer than 5%
receive sentences between 3 and 5 years (Schiraldi, 2018c).
A prison sentence is executed in a juvenile facility for every young adult up to 24
years of age who receives a juvenile sentence (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 94). Under
Section 114, JGG, even young adults up to 24 years of age who have received a sen-
tence of imprisonment under adult criminal law may serve their sentence in a juvenile
facility, a provision that is being applied more often due to declining numbers in juve-
nile facilities. In order for youth imprisonment to be ordered, one of two preconditions
must be met: either the “dangerous tendencies” of the youth exclude community
sanctions as appropriate or there is “gravity of guilt” concerning particularly serious
crimes such as murder or aggravated robbery (D€unkel, 2016b).
Despite the fact that young people in Germany tend to be incarcerated for more
violent offenses than youth in US juvenile facilities, the treatment and living conditions
of incarcerated young adults are very much normalized. For example, in Neustrelitz
Youth Prison, there is an extensive vocational program including professional wood-
working, metal working, culinary instruction and farming, with no use of solitary con-
finement or strip searching (Schiraldi, 2018c).
Germany records convictions and sentences in a Federal Crime Register. However,
the records of juveniles and young adults up to 21-years-old who receive a juvenile
sanction are not registered, with the exception of prison sentences (including sus-
pended prison sentences) for over 1 year, which are recorded but whose access is
restricted (Morgenstern, 2011, pp. 24–25). Furthermore, a Youth Court Judge can
expunge the record on application by a juvenile or young adult no earlier than two
years after completion of a sentence.
The German youth justice system is characterized by a high level of stability in
terms of procedures and sentencing. This is despite the rhetoric in political debates
sometimes being dominated by penal populism. For example, violent subway crimes
in late 2007 led to the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) to call for increased juvenile
sanctions, followed swiftly by a backlash from criminal justice practitioners and an
election loss for the CDU in early 2008 (D€unkel, 2016a, p. 701).
Table 2. Minimum and maximum lengths of imprisonment for juveniles and young adults
in Germany.
Youth Court Regular offenses Very serious offenses
14- to 17-year-olds Minimum is 6 months Maximum is 10 years
Maximum is 5 years
18-, 19- and 20-year-olds (sentenced
according to JGG)
Maximum is 10 years Maximum is 10 years
Maximum is 15 years for an aggra-
vated murder offense
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The Netherlands: Applying and extending youth sanctions
Jurisdiction of the youth justice system
A separate juvenile justice system (known as Kinderwetten or ‘child laws’) has operated
in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 20th century, with sanctions and crimi-
nal proceedings intended to have a primarily “educative” or rehabilitative effect and a
distinctive, child-friendly character (Weijers, 2017, p. 65). The minimum age of criminal
responsibility is 12-years-old.
The Netherlands has a flexible model, which allows for sanctions from the adult
criminal code to be applied to juvenile defendants aged 16 or 17, on the basis of
either the seriousness of the offense, the personality of the defendant, or the circum-
stances under which the offense has been committed (Criminal Code, 2012, Art.
77.b.i). While the youth court judge can order an adult sanction, the case remains in
the juvenile justice system where a youth court judge tries the case and the youth
court procedures are followed during the trial (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 92). Research
has shown that adult custodial sanctions imposed on minors rarely exceed the maxi-
mum youth imprisonment sentence of two years (Criminal Code, 2012, Art. 77.i.1.b),
and for very serious offenses hardly ever exceed eight years imprisonment (Rap &
Weijers, 2014, p. 92).
Emerging adults in the justice system
Proposals to introduce a separate young adult criminal justice system in the
Netherlands began in the 1950s. In 1965, a bill was passed allowing the juvenile jus-
tice sanctions to be applied to “young adults” aged 18 to (but not including) 21.
Efforts to further extend the upper limit to 23 gained traction by 2010 as a result of
debates around brain research (uit Beijerse, 2016). Two reports in particular greatly
influenced the debate: Juvenile and Young Adults: A Plea for Evidence Based Penal Law
(Doreleijers & Fokkens, 2010) and Juvenile Justice Processing: Future-Proof! (Council for
Criminal Justice Application and Youth Protection (RSJ), 2011).
Despite previously touting a populist “tough on crime” stance, in June 2011 State
Secretary of Security and Justice Fred Teeven presented a proposal to raise the age of
youth sanctions to 23 (uit Beijerse, 2016). The main thrust of the arguments in support
of the reform were that 15- to 23-year-olds are responsible for a disproportionately
large share of crime, which must be combatted effectively with evidence-based, indi-
vidualized youth sanctions, depending on the developmental phase of the offender
(Marchena-Slot, 2017, p. 922).
The government drafted a bill based on neurobiological research findings that brain
development is not complete in 18-year-olds, and that essential developments regard-
ing impulse control, emotion management, plan-making and empathy may not be
developed until 24 years of age (Winterdyk, 2014, p. 256). In the Explanatory
Memorandum to the bill, it was noted that this ongoing brain development could be
an explanation as to why a disproportionate number of young adults are involved in
crime. By the time the legislation passed in 2014, there had been a progressive
change in the ruling party. The 23-year-old age limit was maintained, and a provision
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that would have doubled the maximum sentence for juvenile detention from 2 to 4
years was dropped from the bill.
As of April 2014, the Dutch Criminal Code now has a flexible sanction system for
juveniles and young adults aged 16 to (but not including) 23 years, known as
‘adolescentenstrafrecht’ (adolescent criminal law) (Marchena-Slot, 2017, p. 922). No
other country in Europe provides a legal basis for extending the use of juvenile justice
provisions up to the age of 23 years. In practice, the reform raised the upper age limit
for imposing youth sanctions from 21 to 23, and caused all system-involved young
adults aged 18–23 to be assessed by the public prosecutor at an early stage of the
process to determine whether or not they qualify for a youth sanction (uit Beijerse,
2016). Under the law, youth aged 18 and over are still dealt with by the adult criminal
courts, and application of the adult criminal law by those courts is the default option.
However, a recent site visit by the authors suggests that not all young adults subject
to a youth sanction are dealt with by the adult criminal courts. In Rotterdam, the
authors observed a practice by the prosecutor to send young adult offenders to the
youth court (instead of the adult criminal court) if he or she determined that a youth
sanction was suitable. A summary of the new sanction system is shown in Table 3.
The assessment by the public prosecutor on whether or not to apply youth sanc-
tions relies on a social inquiry report into the system-involved youths prepared by the
Dutch probation service on the social, emotional, and cognitive development of the
young adult (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 57). In specific cases, the public prosecutor may
also rely only on a report prepared by the Dutch forensic psychiatry and psychology
service (known as NIFP) assessing for mental health disorders. The prosecutors’ deci-
sion is shaped by national guidelines (uit Beijerse, 2016). At the time of the reforms,
many advocated for youths up to 23 years to originate in the youth court (similar to
Germany). However, this was not considered feasible due to various stakeholder inter-
ests, including the fiscal incentive to keep cases in the adult courts. The courts in the
Netherlands are financed according to the number of defendants appearing in court,
and given that young adults represent a large proportion of criminal defendants, there
was reluctance to transfer this group to the youth court and impact the funding (uit
Beijerse, 2016).
Prior to adolescentenstrafrecht, it was possible for young adults between 18 and 21
to receive a youth sanction or measure under Article 77c of the Criminal Code (such
as confinement in a juvenile facility) if the judge considered the personality of the
offender and/or the circumstances under which the offense was committed as reason
to do so. This provision was introduced in 1965, but was seldom used, and generally
only in cases of young adults with mental disabilities (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 94). The
Table 3. Summary of the jurisdiction and sanctions of the
Youth Court and Criminal Court in the Netherlands.
Age at time of crime Adjudicated by Sanctions according to
12–15 Youth Court Juvenile Justice
16–17 Youth Court Juvenile Justice
Youth Court Adult Criminal Law
18–22 Criminal Court Juvenile Justice
Criminal Court Adult Criminal Law
23 or older Criminal Court Adult Criminal Law
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provision had to be exercised by adult court judges, many of whom appeared to be
unaware of the provision’s existence since it was located in the juvenile section of the
Criminal Code (uit Beijerse, 2016). As was the case prior to the adolescentenstrafrecht
reforms, the personality of the youths and/or the circumstances under which the
offense was committed are still the same two considerations taken into account in
determining whether or not a young adult qualifies for a sanction under the juvenile
criminal law.
While the total number of criminal cases against 18- to 23-year-olds is decreasing,
the application of juvenile criminal law to young adults is increasing as result of ado-
lescentenstrafrecht. Prior to its introduction, the juvenile criminal law applied to fewer
than approximately 160 young adult cases per year (or 1% of all criminal cases against
young adults). After the legal change, the caseload increased to 400 cases per year
(over 4% of all criminal cases involving young adults) (van der Laan, Beerthuizen,
Barendregt, & Beijersbergen, 2017, p. 4). The increase is mainly found in cases against
18- to 21-year-olds (an increase from 0.9% receiving juvenile sanctions in 2014 to 7.3%
in 2016). The application of juvenile criminal law applied to young adults ages 21 and
22 make up only a limited share of the increase (1.1% received a juvenile sanction in
2016) (van der Laan, et al., 2017, p. 4).
In addition, the extension of the age range to age 23 appears to have affected the
treatment of the 16- and 17-year-olds. Although the frequency by which they were
prosecuted as adults was not high with only 2.1% of this age group having received
adult sanctions in 2014, it has since declined further. In 2016, a mere 0.2% of 16- and
17-year-olds received adult sanctions, a 90% decline in 2 years. The reasons for this
change appear to be two-fold. First, before the expansion of the youth justice system,
16- and 17-year-olds were considered older in the youth court and tended to foster a
more serious response. Secondly, along with the change in law has come a greater
understanding of impact of the justice system on adolescent development, including
the benefits of juvenile rehabilitative services as well as the dangers of locking up chil-
dren with older adults (Schiraldi, 2018a).
Role of police, prosecutors, and the courts
The Dutch approach is unique in that both the police and the prosecution have discre-
tionary power and are legally entitled to dispose of cases (Weijers, 2017, p. 75). The
police can dismiss a case and send a youth to a voluntary social support program or
to the Child Care and Protection Board for further investigation. Alternatively, the
police can issue a warning with no further action or impose a small fine in the case of
a misdemeanour (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 114). For minor offenses such as vandalism
or shoplifting that do not require involvement of a prosecutor, police can also refer a
juvenile up to 18-years-old to a community service project called HALT which carries
out restorative “educational” and rehabilitative projects of up to 20 h for first-time
offenders (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 114; Weijers, 2017, p. 66). Finally, the police can
send the charge to the prosecutor for further handling.
The prosecutor plays a central role in cases involving youth in the Netherlands.
Every prosecution office in the Netherlands has designated youth court prosecutors
14 S. MATTHEWS ET AL.
and a public prosecutor’s clerk that deals only with youth cases (Rap & Weijers, 2014,
p. 116). The prosecutor can decide whether to initiate court proceedings or determine
that it is not expedient to prosecute a case. The prosecutor can also conditionally dis-
charge cases that involve a misdemeanour or an offense punishable by a maximum of
6 years imprisonment. Since 2011, the prosecutor has the ability to establish the guilt
of the defendant and order a sanction (including community service not exceeding
60 h, a fine, the revocation of the right to drive motor vehicles, or probation of not
more than 6 months on a juvenile defendant), and the defendant can appeal to the
judge against that decision (Weijers, 2017, p. 67).
For youths, the prosecutor is in charge of the preliminary investigations and only
when ordering pre-trial detention does a youth court judge hear the case in chambers
and determine any pre-trial interventions (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 127). Juvenile
defendants are heard by one youth court judge, or in more serious cases a panel of
three judges, one of whom must be a youth court judge. When the prosecutor intends
to try the youth in court, the judge is legally obliged to ask for a social investigation
report from the Child Care and Protection Board, which will include a recommendation
concerning the most appropriate sanction (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p. 132).
Diversion, confinement, and other penalties
A judge may impose penalties including juvenile confinement up to a maximum of 1
year for 12- to 15-year-olds or 2 years for 16-years-and-over, up to 100 h of community
service, or a fine of up to 4000 e (Weijers, 2017, p. 67). In recent decades, the maxi-
mum penalties for juvenile offenders have increased, but many less punitive sanctions
have also been added. In addition, the judge may choose from a variety of alternative
measures, such as placement in a behavioral institution, which can be extended up to
a maximum of 7 years, though this has become associated with social stigma in the
Netherlands due to the perception of requiring treatment for a “disorder” (Weijers,
2017, p. 67).
More young adults are now receiving the “educational” options under the juvenile
law, including specialized probation caseloads and rehabilitative programming.
Unfortunately, due to a change in state versus local funding for juvenile programs
enacted in 2015, some are concerned that the impact of the adolescentenstrafrecht is
being limited due to the eligibility and accessibility of these programs (Schiraldi, 2018a).
For young adults, the implementation of the juvenile confinement sentence can
either take place in a juvenile institution or an adult prison (Rap & Weijers, 2014, p.
94). From April 2014 to March 2015, 252 young adults were transferred from adult
prisons to the juvenile institutions on the basis of the adolescentenstrafrecht reform
(uit Beijerse, 2016). Minors up to 16-years-old in juvenile confinement spend most of
their day in school and in small groups, based on a pedagogical system of supervision
(Weijers, 2017, p. 64).
Legislation passed in 2001 (known as the Youth Justice Institutions Act or YJIA) reg-
ulates the legal position of young people in confinement (including detailed descrip-
tions of which grounds and by whom a young person may be prevented from
exercising his/her fundamental rights) (Weijers, 2017, p. 64). The YJIA establishes an
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elaborate system for filing complaints for violations, an appeals procedure, and an
independent Supervisory Committee of legal experts and behavioral scientists. The
YJIA also provides that any decision to use coercion or the imposition of disciplinary
measures on youth in juvenile confinement must be made by management, rather
than the correctional officers (Weijers, 2017, p. 64). Similar legislation and regulations
were adopted by Germany in 2007.
In the Netherlands, all criminal convictions and sanctions are kept in a register (the
Judicial Documentation System) for 30 years after the criminal sentence has become
irrevocable, not including diversionary measures issued by police, such as a referral to
the HALT program referred to earlier (Boone, 2011, p. 71). Public and private employ-
ers cannot access the records in the Judicial Documentation System; however, they
can request a “Conduct Certificate,” which is a statement by the Minister of Justice
that there are no objections to the individual practicing a certain profession or fulfill-
ing a certain position. The period of time considered in issuing a Conduct Certificate is
usually limited to the previous four years (Boone, 2011, p. 76).
The number of juvenile institutions has decreased dramatically from 15 facilities
with 2600 beds in 2007, to only seven facilities in 2018, including three centers oper-
ated by the Custodial Institutions Agency and four private youth facilities with approx-
imately 500 beds in total (Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2018; Weijers, 2017, p.
64). Juvenile institutions are now under review nationwide, with the intention to
switch to a customized system of local, small-scale facilities located near the juveniles’
own social network, combined with a few national facilities with specialist care and
higher security. A small-scale pilot shelter was launched in Amsterdam in 2016 provid-
ing places for juveniles who attend school and/or work during the day and return to
the shelter in the evening and on weekends (Weijers, 2017, p. 65).
Croatia: Providing special procedures and assessing maturity
Jurisdiction of the youth justice system
From its inception, Croatia’s youth justice system has sought to employ the “welfare
model,” prioritizing measures with an underlying “educational” or rehabilitative func-
tion to prevent recidivism (Dolezal, 2017, p. 97). The 1918 Decree of the Vice-Roy of
Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia on the Punishment and Protection of Youth established:
(1) a special procedure for dealing with juvenile offenders, (2) special court departments,
(3) court monitoring of the enforcement of educational measures, and (4) a minimum age
of criminal responsibility at 14 (Bojanic, 2010, p. 187; Dolezal, 2017, p. 95).
In 1929, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia adopted a Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedure Act which contained several provisions of the Decree of 1918, and further
outlined three categories of young offenders: children under 14, young juveniles aged
14–16, and older juveniles from the age of 17 up to 21. However, older juveniles were
still treated in the same manner as adult offenders with the exception that they had
less harsh mandatory sentences (Bojanic, 2010, p. 188).
In 1959, the Criminal Code was amended so that juvenile and “young adults” up to
21 were separated from more mature adults, based on an increasing awareness of
social pedagogy, psychology, criminology, and criminal policy. A new system for
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sanctioning youth was introduced, with community-based rehabilitative responses (or
“educational measures”) seen as the favored response and imprisonment seen as an
extraordinary sanction (only to be applied to those aged 16 and above in exceptional
cases) (Bojanic, 2010, p. 188).
Despite experiencing an increase in juvenile crime during the Croatian War of
Independence from 1991 to 1995, Croatia did not respond by imposing more punitive
responses (Dolezal, 2017, p. 97). In March 1993, the Commission for the Development
of Criminal Legislation of the Republic of Croatia proposed to develop a separate,
comprehensive law on the legal status of system-involved youths. The Croatian Youth
Courts Act working group looked to other European countries (particularly Germany)
and recommendations by the UN and Council of Europe in drafting the law (Bojanic,
2010, p. 188). This led to the Croatian Juvenile Courts Act 1997 (CYCA) which: (1) pri-
oritized nonjudicial forms of intervention except where rehabilitative purposes could
not be achieved or serious offenses had been committed; (2) established a series of
“off ramps,” first to prosecution through diversion, followed by alternatives to confine-
ment through educational measures like counseling, community service, juvenile pro-
bation, special “orders” (conditions), day treatment, placement in open community
settings (i.e., group homes), or short-term confinement; (3) introduced specialized
judges, jurors and prosecutors for juveniles and young adults in the courts; and (4)
legally defined the role of the “non-legal professionals” including social pedagogues,
social workers, and psychologists who worked with the courts in dealing with juvenile
and young adults, including advising the judge or prosecutor on psychosocial or crimi-
nological characteristics of the youth and monitoring the implementation of all sanc-
tions (Dolezal, 2017, p. 98).
Under Croatian law, youths are not subject to prosecution until their 14th birthday
and special youth provisions extend to the 21st birthday (Criminal Code, 2011). A sum-
mary of the jurisdiction and sanctions available to youth in the Criminal Court is
shown in Table 4.
Emerging adults in the justice system
For decades before the enactment of the CYCA in 1997, young adults have had a spe-
cial position in Croatian criminal law where they could be sanctioned as juvenile
offenders. Article 2 of the CYCA defines a young adult as a person who at the time of
committing a criminal offense is 18, but not yet 21-years-old (Bojanic, 2010, p. 189).
Table 4. Summary of the jurisdiction and sanctions of the Criminal Court in Croatia.
Age at time of crime Adjudicated by Sanctions according to
14–17 Criminal Court (with special juve-
nile procedure)
Juvenile Justice
18–21 Criminal Court (with special juvenile
procedure if younger than 23 at time
of trial)
Juvenile Justice (if younger than 23 at
time of trial)
Criminal Court (with special juvenile
procedure if younger than 23 at time
of trial)
Adult Criminal Law
Criminal Court Adult Criminal Law
21 or older Criminal Court Adult Criminal Law
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The juvenile court procedure and sanctions can apply to a youth up to the age of 23
at trial.
For young adults, the court is to consider whether the youth’s rehabilitation and
prevention of further offenses can be better achieved by juvenile justice sanctions
(Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 49). When determining the appropriate sanction, the court
will pronounce a juvenile sanction when it can be concluded that the type of offense
and the manner in which it was committed was a demonstration of the youth’s age,
and that the circumstances related to his or her personality justify the imposition of
an “educational” or rehabilitative measure or juvenile imprisonment (Bojanic, 2010, p.
212). The sanction options available to the court are the educational measure of
“special obligations” mentioned below, increased surveillance, or juvenile imprison-
ment. In the case of youths under 21 at the time of trial, the courts can also impose
an “institutional educational measure,” such as a referral to a residential center that
focuses on education and vocational training (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 49). The educa-
tional measures are not to continue beyond the young adult’s 23rd birthday. Also,
once a person has turned 21, they cannot be tried for an offense committed before
the age of 16 (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 50).
Convicted juveniles and young adults serve sentences in juvenile-specific prisons
until they reach the age of 23 (Bojanic, 2010, p. 216). Juvenile incarceration of young
adults cannot exceed 10 years. If the sentence has not been served at their 23rd birth-
day, they are transferred to an adult prison. In exceptional cases, a person who
reaches the age of 23 while in prison may remain in the juvenile prison if it is deemed
necessary for him or her to complete his or her educational or vocational training, or
if the remainder of the sentence is no longer than 6 months. The maximum time at
which a person must be transferred or released from a juvenile prison is 27 (Bojanic,
2010, p. 217). For young adults, judges appear to use juvenile sanctions infrequently
in cases that involve incarceration compared to cases involving community-based
alternative sanctions (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2017; p. 158; Schiraldi, 2018b).
If the young adult is 21 at the time of trial, they can receive a regular imprisonment
sentence in place of juvenile imprisonment (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 50). Where a
young adult at the time of trial has already turned 23, the court will impose a regular
sentence of imprisonment instead of juvenile imprisonment (despite the fact that the
offense was committed when they were under 21) (Bojanic, 2010, p. 212). Where the
regular criminal law is applied to a young adult, the court is not bound to impose the
least severe measure of punishment for that particular criminal offense, but the sen-
tence can be mitigated within certain limits prescribed by the Criminal Code (Bojanic,
2010, p. 212; Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 50).
Role of police, prosecutors, and the courts
There are no special, distinct courts for juvenile and young adults, rather, there are
special procedures and departments housed within the regular municipal courts
(Bojanic, 2010, p. 189). Only municipal courts in larger towns have youth departments
(21 in total) (Caric, 2007, p. 45). The judges and public prosecutors (known as State’s
Attorneys) that staff the youth departments are required to have strong inclinations
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toward upbringing, an understanding of the needs of children and youth, and a basic
knowledge of criminology, social pedagogy, and social welfare for young persons
(Marsavelski, 2012, p. 4).
The network of nonlegal professionals, including social workers and psychologists,
that are based within the court systems advise courts and prosecutors on develop-
mental issues pertaining to juveniles and young adults. These nonlegal professionals
not only interview and provide recommendations to the courts and prosecutors, but
they also stay with cases postsentencing to check up on whether the court’s orders
are being followed and to arrange for postsentencing follow-up hearings, if necessary
(Schiraldi, 2018b).
Diversion, confinement, and other penalties
Under Croatian law, the main purpose of juvenile sanctions is to educate young peo-
ple, develop their overall personality, and to strengthen their sense of personal
responsibility, which has led to the development of a variety of restorative measures.
For example, the CYCA allows the State’s Attorney to decide not to initiate criminal
proceedings based on the willingness of the juvenile or young adult to take part in
what is known as “special obligations,” such as compensation, community service,
vocational training, participation in rehabilitation, or taking part in youth counselling
(Bojanic, 2010, p. 195). An additional option of an out-of-court settlement through
mediation is available, which involves the youth taking responsibility and making
amends with the victim. From 1998 to 2010, 35–45% of juvenile cases (up to age 18)
that have come to the office of the State’s Attorney have been resolved through this
out-of-court settlement (known as a conditional opportunity) (Dolezal, 2017, p. 99).
After the system-involved youth has fulfilled his or her obligations under supervi-
sion of the Center for Social Care, the State’s Attorney makes the final decision
whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings (Bojanic, 2010, p. 196). While the over-
all quantity of juvenile crime from 2000 to 2009 increased slightly, the same data
showed that the types of sanctions imposed did not change, with 97% of all sanctions
against convicted juveniles amounting to “educational measures” and rehabilitative
services, and juvenile incarceration constituting <1% (Dolezal, 2017, p. 105). The
majority of system-involved youth are dealt with by diversionary measures as a direct
consequence of the long recognized “principle of purposefulness” (Marsavelski, 2012,
p. 6) allowing the prosecution and the police a wide degree of discretion (D€unkel,
2016a, p. 702). In 2012, 75.2% of youth ages 14–18 and 26.8% of youth ages 18–21
were diverted (Marsavelski, 2012, pp. 9–10).
The court has the option to impose formal sanctions, including “educational meas-
ures,” safety measures (such as compulsory treatment for substance abuse), and juve-
nile imprisonment (Bojanic, 2010, p. 196). The CYCA sets out a list of sanctions (see
Article 6–31), stating the criteria for each sanction and when and how they can be
applied (Dolezal, 2017, pp. 99–100). For example, youth who were under 16 at the
time of the alleged criminal act may receive only “educational measures” and not a
safety measure or juvenile imprisonment. During the implementation of these meas-
ures, every 6 months the Court must consider whether there are any grounds to
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change or modify the plan. “Educational measures” may last no longer than the
juvenile’s 23rd birthday, and the maximum juvenile imprisonment term is 5 years
(minimum is 6 months), or 10 years for certain criminal offenses (Bojanic, 2010, p.
199). Under the CYCA, imprisonment is used very rarely, with an estimated total of
20–30 juveniles and young adults in youth prisons in all of Croatia (Schiraldi, 2018b).
No sanctions prescribed for adult offenders under the regular criminal law can be
imposed on juveniles under 18 (Caric, 2007, p. 59). In addition, records of youth
handled under juvenile law are always confidential.
Generally, only 8–10% of young adult offenders are sentenced to juvenile sanctions,
mostly suspended juvenile imprisonment or “educational measures” (community-based
rehabilitative services) (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 50). In about 70% of all young adult
convictions, a suspended adult prison sentence is applied, compared to 74% of all
convictions for adults 21 and older (Pruin & D€unkel, 2015, p. 51). The fact that a sus-
pended prison sentence is so often applied and that the application of juvenile sanc-
tions is used so sparingly is likely because the former is less intrusive than the
“educational sanctions” and more rehabilitative responses for juveniles.
Conclusions
As the diverse states of Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Vermont consider
becoming the first US states to extend their juvenile courts’ jurisdictions beyond age
18, we examined practices in Europe, which has much more experience with develop-
mentally distinct approaches to emerging adults, for examples of how such changes
can be enacted. Croatia, Germany, and the Netherlands have extended their juvenile
laws to include youth age 18 and above each in distinct ways fitting their history and
culture. While those countries have distinct approaches to which courts, which facili-
ties and at which ages emerging adults can benefit from juvenile laws and practices,
they also have some commonalities worth examination by US policy-makers. These
generally include (1) greater reliance on informal approaches to offending by juveniles
and emerging adults; (2) higher minimum ages at which juvenile laws can be applied
to children; (3) greater reliance on “educational” – or rehabilitative – approaches to
youth found involved in delinquent or criminal behavior; (4) greater confidentiality
protections for youth and young adults; and (5) less reliance on incarceration, either in
adult or juvenile facilities, as a sanction for criminal behavior. It is appropriate for the
United States to seriously consider adopting these strategies.
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